Name: AxelrodExamples
Owner: Axelrod-Python
Description: :bar_chart: Analysis and examples for the Axelrod-Python library
Created: 2015-07-31 17:47:59.0
Updated: 2018-02-13 15:18:29.0
Pushed: 2017-06-27 01:50:04.0
Size: 24490
Language: Python
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Strategy visualizations and example tournaments for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma library Axelrod.
The first strategy visualization displays how often a strategy cooperates with every other strategy per round, averaged over many interactions (~200 repeated games between every pair of strategies).
ZDGTFT2
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Calculator
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
As you can see, the introduction of noise alters the efficacy of Calculator's cycle detection algorithm.
We can also visualize the average payoff per round earned by each strategy versus every other strategy per round, averaged over many interactions (~200 repeated games between every pair of strategies).
Alternator
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05
Mean Score Heatmap
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Click to see all the renderings for each strategy.
See the python script example_tournaments.py for the exact details of each tournament.
This tournament covers all strategies in the Axelrod library that follow the standard Axelrod rules.
Score Distributions
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Win Distributions
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Pairwise Payoffs
Left: no noise | Right: 5% noise
Click to see all the renderings for each tournament.
All Fair Strategies This tournament covers all strategies in the Axelrod library that follow the standard Axelrod rules.
Deterministic All deterministic strategies.
Stochastic All stochastic strategies.
Finite Memory The players in this tournament are all strategies that remember a finite number of rounds (i.e. do not retain history indefinitely).
Memory One The players in this tournament are all memoryone strategies (having memory depth 0 or 1).
Stewart & Plotkin 2012 This tournament covers the same strategies in Stewart and Plotkin's 2012 tournament
Tyler Singer-Clark This tournament's players are those used in Tyler Singer-Clark's paper Morality Metrics On Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Players